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APPLICATION OF THE RuLE IN SHELLEY'S CASE WHERE THERE ARE ALTERNATIVE
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
LAND was conveyed to a daughter and her husband "during their lifetime, then to
the heirs of the body of our daughter, and if she leaves no child or children surviving
her, then to her heirs according to law." The daughter died childless, after having
devised all her real estate to her husband. In a partition suit in which her surviving
brothers and sisters disputed her husband's claim to the land, the latter contended that
the words "then to her heirs according to law" were words of limitation, conveying,
under the Rule in Shelley's case, a remainder to his wife, contingent on her dying
without children surviving, and that, when that contingency occurred, the second
remainder eo instanti became executed in his wife, merging her life estate to give her
a fee, which passed to him by her will. The surviving brothers and sisters contended
that the Rule in Shelley's Case did not apply because the remainder to the heirs of
the wife was one of alternative contingent remainders, and concluded that they simply
took from the grantor as purchasers when the contingency as to the ultimate takers
was determined by the wife's death. The Supreme Court of Illinois,1 with two judges
dissenting, held that the Rule did not apply, and, in accordance with the Illinois
descent laws, gave the husband one-half the property in fee as statutory heir and
the brothers and sisters the other half,2 subject to the husband's life estate under the
deed as survivor.
In the ordinary case of a gift to A for life or in tail, with remainder to his heirs
or to the heirs of his body, the Rule operates immediately to attach the remainder to
A as a vested interest, whereupon, since there is nothing separating A's particular
estate from his remainder, a merger of the two estates takes place to produce a present
estate in fee simple or fee tail in A.8 Yet it was very early indicated that the Rule
operates similarly even though there can be no immediate merger by reason of the
existence of an intermediate vested estate, as in the case of a gift to A for life,
remainder to B for life, remainder to the heirs of A.4 In such a case, if the remainder
to B terminates by reason of B's death before the end of A's life estate, the latter
will then merge into the remainder which has attached to A to give him a fee simple
in possession. If B survives A, A's remainder ripens into a fee simple at B's death
in the hands of whoever has obtained the remainder by devise, descent, or inter vi'os
conveyance. 5 A fortiori the Rule operates if the intermediate estate is contingent, as
in the case of a gift to A for life, remainder to B for life if he marry before A's
death, remainder to the heirs of A;6 for the interposed remainder will at the most
1. Gehlbach v. Briegel, 359 Ill. 316, 194 N. E. 591 (1934) (two judges dissenting), noted
in (1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 97, and (1935) 33 MicH. L. REv. 1112.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1935) c. 39, H 1 (3a).
3. Bails v. Davis, 241 Ill. 536, 89 N. E. 706 (1909); 1 HAYES, CoxvzYANcnwo (5th ed,
1840) 542; see (1911) 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 963.
4. Provost of Beverly's Case, Y. B. 40 Edw. III, 9 (1366).
5. 2 FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVIsES (10th ed. 1844) § 409;
Carpenter v. Hubbard, 263 Ill. 571, 105 N. E. 688 (1914). In the meantime the life tenant,
by transferring both his life estate and his vested remaindqr, can convey the equivalent of
an estate in fee subject to the interposed vested remainder. See Cotton v. Moseley, 159 N. C.
1, 5, 74 S. E. 454, 456 (1912).
6. Stafford v. Martin, 23 Atl. 734 (Md. 1892); Colson v. Colson, 2 Atk. *246 (Ch. 1741).
become vested by B's marriage before A's death, or, if B has not married, it will com-
pletely fail at the determination of the particular estate in A. Indeed, it may be even
sooner destroyed by a merger of A's life estate into his remainder in fee simple through
the transfer of both interests to a third party.
The only factor which distinguishes these cases from such a case as the instant one
of a gift to A for life, with alternative contingent remainders7 to her surviving chil-
dren, or, if there are none surviving her, to her heirs, is that the remainder to A's
heirs in the latter case is not only contingent as to the persons who will eventually
prove on A's death to be her heirs, as it is in every case where the Rule operates,8
but also contingent in that it will vest in possession only in the event of A's dying
without surviving children. This contingency as to event, however, does not render
the word "heirs" any the less a word of limitation, for, if the remainder ever becomes
executed, the heirs will still take in an indefinite line of succession. And since the
Rule operates solely on the remainder, even if a consequent merger is impossible 1
it can operate to attach to the ancestor a remainder which is contingent as to event
as well as one which is not; its purpose of immediately ascertaining the remainderman
is equally accomplished in both cases. It is true that the operation of the Rule in
such a case has the unique result that the same person owns both the life estate and
.the remainder, although the remainder is so limited that it cannot possibly vest in
possession until the death of its owner.0 However, this fact is significant only insofar
as it affects the possibility that an heir or devisee of the ancestor can obtain a fee.
There is no doubt that he ran, for, if the devise be considered as taking effect an instant
after the execution of the second contingent remainder, it will operate on the fee
resulting from the merger eo instanti of death; and if an instant before the execution
of the remainder, the devisee will simply receive a contingent remainder in fee which
an instant later will vest in possession.10 A further consequence of this alternative
limitation is the existence in the original donor of a reversion in fee, which descends
to his heirs."1 Accordingly, the life tenant and the reversioner or reversioners, by
conveying their interests to the same third party, might succeed in effecting a merger
which would prematurely destroy both outstanding alternative contingent remainders.2
However, this destructibility of the contingent remainders is a purely collateral con-
Coke considered the remainder to the heirs as merging with the life estate immediately, but
only sub modo, opening to admit the outstanding remainder upon the happening of the con-
tingency on which it is expectant. Bowles's Case, 11 Coke 79b (K. B. 1616); 1 Fnum,
op. cit. supra note 5, at *37, *223; 2 id. at § 410. The effect is the same, however, so that
no reason exists for resorting to such a fiction.
7. That the deed created alternative contingent remainders was undisputed. Loddington
v. Kime, 1 Salk. 224 (K. B. 1693) (expressly held not executory devises); Farmer v. Reed,
339 Ill. 156, 166 N. E. 498 (1929).
8. The court in the instant case must have referred to the contingency as to event when
it said that the Rule is inapplicable where the remainder is contingent.
9. 2 BL. Co . § 168; 1 Fr.uxA , op. cit. supra note 5, at *34; see Bond v. Moore, 236
IMI. 576, 591, 86 N. E. 386, 391 (1908).
10. See KA es, EsrAx-s, FuTuan INTrEr AND ILrL Prsr=.-rs n. I= ois (2d
ed. 1920) § 324, n. 28, § 325, n. 42; Hudson, Thze Transfer of Remabldcrs (1916) 26 YAXX
L. J. 24, 27.
11. Bender v. Bender, 292 Ill. 358, 127 N. E. 22 (1920).
12. This is a simple expedient in the many cases like the instant one where the life tenant
inherits part or all of the reversion as heir of the donor. Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576,
86 N. E. 386 (1908); Fuller v. Fuller, 315 MI. 214, 146 N. E. 174 (1925); Hop-=n, Esu,%
(3d ed. 1923) § 152.
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sequence of their vulnerability at common law, a result attainable whether or not the
Rule in Shelley's Case were applied, and it should have no effect upon the application
of the Rule. 13 There would thus appear to be nothing distinctive about a gift of a
life estate with an alternative contingent remainder in fee to the life tenant's heirs
which should preclude on principle the operation of the Rule,14 and, although the
problem has never been extensively treated, both courts and commentators are prac-
tically in unanimity in holding the Rule operative in such a case.15
The instant decision might be explained on the ground that the court simply mis-
applied the principles of the Rule and the authorities. On the other hand, there is
language in the opinion which indicates the probability that the court was availing
itself of an opportunity to narrow the application of a rule admittedly in derogation
of the donor's intent.18 Such a motive should not occasion surprise, for the legis-
13. Contingent remainders are no longer destructible by merger in Illinois, although the
statute, not being retroactive, does not govern the instant case. Iur,. Ray. STAT. (Cahill,
1935) c. 148, II 24; see HORNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 192a.
14. The fact that the life estate in the instant case was limited to husband and wife
jointly and the remainder to the heirs of the wife alone does not preclude the operation of
the Rule. Bails v. Davis, 241 Ill. 536, 89 N. E. 706 (1909).
15. Loring v. Eliot, 82 Mass. 568 (1860); Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N. H. 498 (1860);
Stewart v. Kenower, 7 W. & S. 288 (Pa. 1844); Williams's Appeal, 83 Pa. 377 (1877); Eby
v. Shank, 196 Pa. 426, 46 Atl. 495 (1900); In re White & Hindle's Contract, 7 Ch. Dlv. 201
(1877); Baker v. Scott, 62 III. 86 (1871) (remainder to A's heirs provided A reaches the ago
of twenty-three); Ryan v. Allen, 120 I. 648, 12 N. E. 65 (1887) (remainder to A's heirs
provided his father does not sell the property); Williams v. Holly, 4 N. C. *266 (1814)
(fee tail); McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R. I. 314, 53 At]. 43 (1902) (remainder to A's heirs
provided A leaves no surviving sisters); see Hanes v. Central Ill. Utilities Co., 262 Ill. 86,
90, 104 N. E. 156, 157 (1914) ; CHArLIs, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) 163; 1 FEARNE, op. cit.
supra note 5, at *34; 1 HAYEs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 544; 3 JARMA , Wias (7th ed. 1930)
1824; KALEs, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 440; 1 TIEANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed, 1920)
§ 148; 2 WASHBURNE, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) § 1609. Contra: Robeson v. Duncan,
74 N. J. Eq. 745, 70 Atl. 685 (Ch. 1908) (to A and the heirs of her body, but, if she die
without surviving heirs of her body, reversion to the grantor or his estate); see Harlan
v. Manington, 152 Iowa 707, 716, 133 N. W. 367, 371 (1911); cf. Melsheimer v. Gross, 58
Pa. 412 (1868). In Boon v. Boon, 348 Il. 120, 180 N. E. 792 (1932), which the instant
court thought decisive of the case, it was held only that the first alternative remaindermen took
as purchasers after the determination of the life estate. This was obviously correct, for
there, as in the instant case, the words "heirs of the body" were qualified to mean surviving
children. Hauser v. Power, 356 Ill. 521, 191 N. E. 64 (1934); see Kemp v. Reinhard, 228
Pa. 143, 147, 77 Atl. 436, 437 (1910); Kales, Application of the Rule in Shelley's Case Whero
"Heirs" in the Remainder to Heirs is Used as a Word of Purchase and Not as a Word of
Limitation (1912) 28 L. Q. REv. 148.
Most of the above authorities regard the merger of the ancestor's life estate with the
remainder attached to him under the Rule as postponed until the remainder becomes exe-
cuted. But a few speak of an immediate sub modo merger subject to opening up if the first
alternative remainder becomes executed, misciting Bowles's Case, 11 Coke 79b (K. B. 1616),
cited note 6, supra, where there was an intermediate contingent remainder, but where the
second remainder was not an alternative one. Dennett v. Dennett, supra; Stewart v. Ken-
ower, supra; In re White & Hinde's Contract, supra, semble.
16. Perrin v. Blake, 1 HARORAvE, LAW TRAcTs (1787) 487 (Ex. 1773); Davis v. Sturgeon,
198 Ill. 520, 64 N. E. 1016 (1902). But cf. Westcott v. Meeker, 144 Iowa 311, 122 N. W.
964 (1909). It is noteworthy that, in the instant case, if, as the court thought, the grantor's
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latures of some thirty states have expressed their views on the perennial con-
troversy over the wisdom of the Rule by abolishing it altogether.17 However, the
Rule is well settled in Illinois as a fixed rule of property,18 and so long as the legis-
lature is silent, it seems wiser to apply it consistently with the technical principles
governing its application. Its piecemeal amendment by judicial legislation will
inevitably result in utter confusion, due to the impossibility of predicting how far
the process of restricting its operation will be carried in the fqture.
ILLEGAL STOCK ACQUwsIrONS UNDER SECION 7 or THn CLAYToN Ac?
IN August, 1934, The Corrigan, McKinney Steel Company and Republic Steel
Corporation signed an agreement to combine. Under this agreement the former
company agreed to sell all of its assets to the latter, to distribute pro rata to its stock-
holders the Republic Steel Corporation stock and other securities which it was to
receive in consideration of its assets, and to dissolve. The principal purpose of the
combination was to acquire the necessary balance between ingot and finished steel-
making capacity. Republic Steel Corporation had an excess of finishing facilities and
the other company an excess of raw materials and ingot capacity. But, while the pur-
pose of the combination was vertical integration, competition which had existed be-
tween the two corporations in the sale of pig iron, semi-finished steel, and other pro-
ducts, would at the same time be terminated. In February, 1935, the Attorney Gen-
eral brought suit to enjoin consummation of the merger agreement as a violation of
the Clayton Act.1 No contention was made by the Government that the merger
would tend to create a monopoly, or was inimical to the public interest. The suit was
predicated on the sole ground that the combination would violate a literal interpreta-
tion of the first clause of Section 7 of the Act.2 The court refused to enjoin con-
summation of the agreement on the ground that it had not been shown that public
injury would result.8
The suit by the Government is novel because of its attempt to bring the method
of combination used in the present case within the meaning of Section 7. This section
provides that no corporation shall acquire the whole or any part of the stock of an-
other corporation where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the two corporatibns. It further prohibits the acquisition by
a corporation of the stock of two or more corporations where the effect of the acquisi-
tion or the use of stock control may be to substantially lessen competition between
the latter corporations. Clearly, any use of the holding company device by which
one company acquires a controlling stock interest in a competitor or in two companies
intent was to keep the property in his family blood, he could easily have provided for a
second alternative remainder to his own heirs rather than to the heirs of his daughter or
omitted the second remainder entirely. See Comment (1935) 48 HAnv. L. lRv. 1162, 1212.
17. 1 Pow=., CAsEs ON TRusTs AND ESTATEs (1932) 725; Legis. (1932) 45 H.V. L.
Rnv. 571; Irwin, Legislative Limiting of the Rule in Shelley's Case in Pcnnsylvari (1935)
40 DIcE. L. Rv. 27. The arguments for and against the Rule are forcefully stated in
Doyle v. Andis, 127 Iowa 36, 102 N. W. 177 (1905).
18. Baker v. Scott, 62 Ill. 86 (1871) ; People v. Emery, 314 Ill. 220, 145 N. E. 349 (1924).
With respect to the effect upon the Rule of the Statute of Entails, I. R!v. ST,%T. (Cahill,
1935) c. 30, ff 6, see KA=E, op. cit. supra note 10, at §§ 406, 418-420.
1. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 12-27 (1926).
2. 38 STAT. 731, § 7 (1914) 15 U. S. C. A. § 18 (1926).
3. United States v. Republic Steel Corporation, 11 F. Supp. 117 (N. D. Ohio, 1935).
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competing with each other falls within the meaning of the Act.4 But combinations
effected by statutory merger, that is, the absorption of one company by another,o
or by consolidation, that is, the uniting of the two corporations to form a new cor-
poration,6 do not involve stock acquisitions by either of the combining corporations,
and hence do not fall within the Act.7 Nor does a combination effected by the pur-
chase of assets with cash come within the wording of Section 7. However, if, as
in the present case, payment for the assets is made in stock of the purchasing cor-
poration, the selling corporation does acquire, at least until it is dissolved and the
stock distributed to its stockholders, stock in a competing company. Although the
possibility that the stock acquired by the selling corporation falls within the Act has
been recognized,8 nevertheless, the conclusion that combination by this method is
lawful seems sound since the only stock acquisitions prohibited by the Act are those
that cause the lessening of competition. If a corporation acquires stock in a com-
peting unit and uses the stock to vote for a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets,
the cause of the lessening of competition is clearly the stock acquisition and the pro.
posed combination may be set aside if the Federal Trade Commission has issued its
order for divestiture of stock before the combination is effected/1  But where, as in
the present case, the agreement to combine is brought about without the use of stock
control, it is the purchase of assets, rather than the acquisition bf stock by the selling
corporation, that causes the lessening of competition. 10 No rported case has previ-
4. United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (Mass. 1919); Aluminum
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), cert. denied, 261 U. S. ,
616 (1923).
S. BALLANTiNE, CoR ORTIoNs (1927) § 240; 15 FLETCnER, CYCLOPEDIA Or CORPORATIxONS
(perm. ed. 1931) § 7041.
6. Ibid.
7. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 U. S. $87, 595
(1934).
8. Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 179,
266; Opinion of the Attorney-General on the Steel Mergers, 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 225, 241
(1922). But see Conference Rulings of the Federal Trade Commission, I F. T. C. 541
(1915); Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission (1934) 52; HFNDFRso , Thr
FEDERAL TRADE CoimssIoN (1924) 40.
9. Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company, 272 U. S. 554 (1926); Arrow-
Hart & Hegeman Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 291 U. S. 587 (1934), noted In (1934) 43
YALE L. J. 1312. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting in this case, said: "It is true that the 'Clayton
Act does not forbid corporate mergers, but it does forbid the acquisition by one corpora-
tion of the stock of competing corporations so as substantially to lessen competition. It
follows that mergers effected, as they commonly are, through such acquisitions of stock neces-
sarily involve violations of the Act, as this one did. Only in rare instances would there
be hope of a successful merger of independently owned corporations by securing consent of
their stockholders in advance of the acquisition of a working stock control of them. Hence
the establishment of such control by the purchase or pooling of voting stock, often
effected in secrecy, is the normal first step towards consolidation."
10. Irvine, Uncertainties of section 7 of the Clayton Act (1928) 14 Co.N. L. Q. 28.
The Federal Trade Commission, recognizing the limited scope of section 7, has recently rec-
ommended that it should be amended to prohibit acquisitions of assets, where the result IS
the substantial lessening of competition. Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission
(1935) 16, 48. If this recommendation were adopted, presumably combinations of com-
peting corporations effected by merger, consolidation, or by the purchase of assets either
for cash or stock would fall within the section, thus obviating the considerations raised in
this Note.
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ously raised this issue," and the court here did not pass on it, although a clear holding
on the question would have been valuable because of the large number of industrial
combinations effected in this way.' 2
/- That the Government should have brought suit here is even more surprising in
the light of the interpretation the courts have given the phrase "substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition." Literally interpreted, the wording would prevent all com-
binations brought about by stock acquisition if any competition existed between the
two companies, since immediately upon combination all competition would cease.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that substantial competition must have ex-
isted.' 3 Furthermore the Supreme Court has intimated,14 and the lower courts have
held, that the resultant lessening of competition in the industry as a whole must be of
such a degree as will injuriously effect the public.15 The court in the present case had
adequate authority for deciding that a combination of competing units comprising
less than 9% of the productive capacity of the industry was not against the public
interest. By its decision, moreover, the Government was prevented from being placed
in the anomalous position of fostering cooperation among the members of the industry
under the then existing code,16 while at the same time preventing under the anti-trust
laws the combination of two companies when there was no possibility of the creation
of a monopoly.
PRnIvuGE Or NEWSPAPERMEN TO WITHHOLD SOURCES OF INFoRMATION FRnOM
THE COURT
IT is a universally recognized maxim that the public has a right to every man's
evidence, and the exemptions which exist are distinctly exceptional. In addition
to such admittedly privileged topics as state and trade secrets, political votes, and
theological opinions,' a privilege not to divulge confidential communications is
11. HANDLER, loc. cit. supra note 8; IRvxNE, loc. cit. supra note 10.
12. HANDLER, loc. cit. supra note 8. The fact that the legality of the proposed combina-
tion was passed upon while it was still a paper transaction suggests a method of overcoming
the criticism that the act provides no procedure whereby preliminary approval can be given
to a proposed plan. Podell, Our Anti-Trust Laws and the Econon ic Situation, 17 A. B. A. J.
254 (1931); Torbriner and Jaffe, Revision of the Anti-Trust Laws (1932) 20 CAL. L. REv.
585. Thus through a Department of Justice Release of Aug. 2, 1935, the Attorney
General announced that "This case was brought in order that the agreement should
be submitted to judicial scrutiny. It was fully tried and under the facts as found the court
pronounced the proposed transaction legal. In view of this holding as to the particular
situation developed at the trial it has been concluded that an appeal would be unavailing."
N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1935, at 17, col. 8.
13. International Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291 (1930).
14. See International Shoe Company v. Federal Trade Commision, 280 U. S. 291, 298
(1930).
15. V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 54 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931);
Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 51 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 3d,
1931) ; Moody & Waters Co. v. Case Moody Co., 354 i. 82, 187 N. E. 813 (1933) (§ 7 of
the Corporation Act, ILL. REv. STAT. Axx. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 32, § 7, given same con-
struction; Comment (1930) 39 YA.z L. J. 1042; Note (1934) 47 HARv. L. REV. 1395.
16. See Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Practice of the Steel Industry under
the Code (1935).
1. 4 Wicn Eo, EvIDsEc (2d ed. 1923) c. 76.
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accorded to persons standing in certain important social relationships, namely, the
relationships of attorney and client,2 husband and wife,3 government and informer,'
and fellow jurors.&5 Most jurisdictions have also added by statute, the relationship
of physician and patient, 6 and priest and penitent.7 These relationships have been
granted such a privilege because in the opinion of the public they merit careful
conservation and the injury to them which would result from enforced disclosuro
of confidential information acquired therein, would be greater than the loss to justice
occasioned by granting the privilege. The mere fact that a communication Is
imparted in confidence or under oath of secrecy does not create a privilege, nor is
the relationship accorded a privilege if the element of confidence is not essential to
its continued existence.8 Accordingly a confidential communication to a clerk,0 com-
mercial agency,' 0 banker," agent,' 2 or to persons in a contractual or fiduciary rela-
tionship,13 is not privileged from compulsory disclosure.
Newspapermen have frequently refused to divulge their sources of information,
claiming such a privilege. In the course of a recent grand jury investigation of the
so-called "policy racket" in New York City, a reporter wa*s called before the Grand
Jury and questioned about a series of articles whiclh he had written, indicating that
2. This privilege was unquestioned as early as the reign of Elizabeth. Berd v. Lovelace,
Cary 88 (Ch. 1577) (solicitor exempted from examination); Dennis v. Codrington, Cary
143 (Ch. 1580) (a counsellor is not to be examined of any matter, wherein he bath been
of counsel).
3. This is one of the earliest privileges to be enforced, but the last to be definitely recog-
nized and distinguished. 5 WIGOORE, EVIDENCE § 2333.
4. Miachel v. Matson 81 Kan. 360, 105 Pac. 537 (1909); see Wilson v. U. S., 65 F.
(2d) 621, 624 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933). 5 WIGmoRE, EvDENcE § 2374(f).
5. Burns International Detective Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn. 165, 164 N. IV. 590 (1917);
Ward Baking Co. v. Western Union, 205 App. Div. 723, 200 N. Y. Supp. 865 (3d Dep't,
1923); 5 WiGmoE, Ev sFzcE § 2361(a).
6. More than half the states have such a statute. 5 WIom oa, EvIzNCE § 2380. 2 X.
Y. REv. SrAT. 1829, pt. 3, c. 7, art. 8, § 73 (first statute passed in United States, 1828).
Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120 Conn. 161, 179 AtI. 644 (1935) (no privilege in state without such a
statute).
7. More than half the states have such a statute. 5 Wfmoa, EvmwicE § 2395. CAL.
Gw. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1933) § 1881(3) (typical statute). Com. v. Drake, 15 Mass.
161 (1818) (early case of denial of privilege where there was no statute).
8. Wigmore has predicated four fundamental conditions as necessary to the establish-
ment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications between persons standing in
a given relation:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and) satisfactory main-
tenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tion must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
5 WiG3roRE, EVDENcE § 2285.
9. Corps v. Robinson, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3,252 at 597 (C. C. D. Pa. 1809).
10. See Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U. S. 607, 617 (1894).
11. Harriman v. Int. Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
12. Gunther v. Baker, 48 N. D. 1071, 188 N. W. 575 (1922).
13. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N. E. 407 (1922) (employee of
licensed detective has no privilege).
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he had information of the matters under investigation. Refusing to disclose his
source upon the ground that he was privileged as a newspaperman, he was cited
for contempt of court and adjudged guilty.' 4 The Appellate Division in sustaining
the decision said that communications made to reporters are not included in any
statutory privilege, and if any such privilege is to be prescribed, it should be done
by the Legislature. 5 At common law this prerogative, claimed by reporters, has no
justification and has been denied by the courts in the few available reported cases.P
However, as a practical matter, many of the lower courts have upheld the claims
of newspapermen without expressly recognizing any privilege. Thus contempt pro-
ceedings have been dismissed when the accused has contended that disclosure of
his source would tend to incriminate him;' 7 where the reporter's testimony disclosed
that he had no material proof to add to that already in the possession of the grand
jury or state's attorney;' 8 where the grand jury had already returned an indict-
ment in a murder investigation, and it was held that the sources of the reporter's
story -were therefore irrelevant; 19 and even where the accused contended that it
would deprive him of his means of livelihood, -0 although the latter claim has more
often been denied as a valid defense.2 ' There are also at least two states which have
passed statutes giving newspapermen a "blanket" privilege,- and several attempts
have been made in other states as well as in Congress to pass similar legislation,
but unsuccessfully.P
Keeping open the sources of news is the chief argument for granting such a
privilege to newspapermen. Not only have the representatives of the press found
it to some advantage to build up a reputation for their ability to keep a confidence,
but have also developed a professional pride in this ability and have even written
14. N. Y. Times, May 15, 1935, at 1, col. 4.
15. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of N. Y. County, 245 App. Div. 97, 2E0 N. Y.
Supp. 904 (3d Dep't 1935).
16. Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136
Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 781 (1911); In re Julius Grunow, 84 N. J. L. 235, 85 Ad. 1011 (1913);
People ex rel Phelps v. Fancher, 4 Thomp. & C. 467 (N. Y. 1874); In the matter of
Wayne, 4 U. S. D. C. of Hawaii 475 (1914); see People v. Durant, 116 Cal. 179, 220,
48 Pac. 75, 86 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 303, 184 Pac. 375, 377 (1919).
17. Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79 (1914).
18. (Aug. 11, 1934) 67 ED. AND PuB. 10 (Sloan case--reporter for Chicago American).
19. (Aug. 19, 1933) 66 ED. AxD PB. 20.
20. (Dec. 9, 1933) 66 ED. AND Pus. 16.
21. See Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 81, 70 S. E. 781, 735 (1911).
22. Maryland passed such a statute ag early as 1897. MI. AmT. CoDn (Bagby, 1924)
art. 35, § 2 ("No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or
journal shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial or before any com-
mittee of the legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or information procured or
obtained by him for and published in the newspaper on which he is engaged, connected
with or employed.") New Jersey passed a simila statute in 1933. N. .. Sz,'-. Sanvie-
(1933) sec. 70. Ala. and Cal. have also passed simila statutes, recently. (Oct. S, 1935)
68 ED. Am PuB. 26.
23. The Schackno Bill was introduced in New York in 1930 to grant a privilege to news-
papermen. Another bill failed in Texas in 1931, and both the United States Senate
and House of Representatives refused to pass bills introduced by Senator Capper and Rep-
resentative La Guardia, in 1929. See (Sept. 1, 1934) 67 ED. ANn PuB. 9. The Illinois Legis.
lature passed such a bill in 1935, but it was vetoed by Governor Homer (July 20, 1935)
68 ED. ANn PuB. 18; also see (Oct. 5, 1935) 68 En. AND PuB. 26.
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it into their code of ethics.2 It is contended that this trust in newspapermen
facilitates the gathering of information, which because of fear or other personal
motives would never be given to the police or to a public official. This is said to
result in the exposure of crimes and anti-social conditions which would otherwise
be unrevealed; in the exposure of maladministration and corruptions in public office,
thus acting as a check on government officials; 25 and in abetting rather than in hinder-
ing the administration of justice. It is further contended that the relation between
newspapermen and source is analogous to the other privileged relationships, such as
attorney and client, and physician and patient, and should therefore be included
with them; also that an immunity from disclosure is essential for maintaining the
freedom of the press.26
However, the contention that a denial of immunity from compulsory disclosure
will destroy many sources of news, or weaken the relationship between newspaper-
men and their informants is a very questionable reason for according a privilege to
communications between confidential informers and newspapermen. For informa-
tion acquired by newspapermen by way of confidential communications is but a
minor source of the great fountain of news available to newspapers. Moreover,
such information can often be gathered despite the fact that communications between
newspapermen and their informers remain unprivileged. In addition there is an
already existing privilege for confidential communications between government and
informer2 7 which lessens the need for granting one to those connected with a news-
paper. One of the chief objections, especially of the courts and the legal profession,
to granting such a prerogative to newspapermen is the fear that it will result in
weakening the authority of the courts, and in the exclusion of necessary evidence,
thus becoming an obstacle to the correct disposal of litigation.28 Another objection
is based on the ground that it will leave the way open to reckless publication, since
such a privilege will encourage the disclosure of the information itself. Further
objections are based on the apprehension that a privilege would make detectives
out of the reporters 29 and that it might result in undesirable alliances with the
underworld.80
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TO PUBLISH REPORTS OF CURRENT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A, B and C were tried seriatim for the murder of a fellow convict. In such
a situation the evidence in each case is necessarily similar. On the ground that pub-
lication of testimony adduced in the trial of A would obstruct the administration of
24. "That newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confi-
dential information in court oe, before other judicial or investigating bodies, and that the
newspaperman's duty to keep confidences shall include those he shared with one employer
after he has changed his employment." SELDEs, FR=RIom OF Tim PRESS 371 (Code of
Ethics adopted by American Newspaper Guild 5).
25. Speech at Convention of Sigma Delta Chi Convention in Chicago (Oct. 21, 1933)
66 ED. AND PUB. 13.
26. Siebert & Ryniker, Press Winning Fight, to Guard Sources (Sept. 1, 1934) 67 ED.
AND PUB. 9.
27. 5 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2374(f).
28. Governor Homer in vetoing a bill passed by the Illinois Legislature said: "I
believe that if this bill becomes a law it would work a great injury to the administra-
tion of justice. It disregards sound legal principles, has no basis in justice and might lead
to great abuses.' (July 20, 1935) 68 ED. AI PUB. 18.
29. See (Aug. 17, 1935) 68 ED. Aim PUB. 4.
30. See (Oct. 5, 1935) 68 ED. mD PuB. 26.
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justice by influencing prospective jurors for the trials of B and C, the trial judge
issued an order restraining publication of testimony adduced in the trial of A until
all three trials had terminated. Editors and reporters of three newspapers disregarded
the order of the court by daily publication of accurate reports of testimony adduced
in the trial of A. After citation and hearing, they were adjudged guilty of contempt
for violating the court's order. An appellate court in habeas corpus proceedings,
however, held that the order restraining publication was void as an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of the press.'
Concession that the press should be free from prohibitions to publish what it
pleased, although punishable subsequent to publication as in contempt of court for
abuse of that freedom, was the first great gain in the long struggle for freedom of
the press.2 But its immunity from such so-called prior restraints is no longer quite
absolute. Prior restraints have been imposed upon the press to safeguard property
rights, 3 to protect public health and morals,4 and to defend against clear and
imminent danger of destruction of the government.5 But, with the exceptions noted,
the courts adhere, as did the appellate court in the principal case, to the broad
doctrine that a statute or order forbidding publication is an unlawful abridgment
1. Ex parte Pooley, Ex parte Cottingham, Tex. Ct. Cr. App., Nov. 6, 1935, reported in
N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1935, at 20, col 7.
2. The conservative element advocated complete censorship. Liberals deired a pre.s
immune to all liability. Blackstone effected a compromise, granting to the press freedom
from restraint imposed prior to publication, but imposing liability subsequent to publication
for abuse of the freedom. See 4 BL. CoMI. *151; Madison, Report on the Virgjnii Resolu-
tions, 4 ELnor, DmATrs oN T= F.DonA. Co.ns= =o. (1866) 546, 569; CminxU, FaRnwx
oF SPEEcHr (1920) c. 1.
3. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921) (holding a state statute prohibiting injunc-
tions in labor disputes unconstitutional on ground that business enterprise is a property
right which may be protected from publications of striking employees); Chamber of
Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (commission
order to cease and desist from publishing false statements concerning commodity exchanges
held valid); Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N. C. 406, 24 S. E. 212 (1896) (contract right
against vendor of newspaper that he not compete with vendee); see Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 HL V. L. Ri.. 640, 641.
4. State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 46 AUt. 409 (1900) (statute prohibiting sale of news-
papers devoted mainly to scandal, lechery, or immoral conduct of persons); State v. Bair,
92 Iowa 28, 60 N. W. 486 (1894) (statute prohibiting unlicensed, itinerant drug vendors
from professing by writing an ability to treat disease); State v. Pioneer Pres Company,
100 Minn. 173, 110 N. W. 867 (1907) (misdemeanor to publish account of an execution in
state penitentiary); Solomon v. City of Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 19, 159 N. E. 121 (1926)
(misdemeanor to sell publications chiefly devoted to horse racing news and tips on races).
5. Fox v. State, 236 U. S. 273 (1915) (advocacy of nude bathing as counselling dis-
respect for the law and threatening overthrow of government); Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616 (1919) (five thousand leaflets in English and a foreign language appealing to
workers to oppose interference of United States in Russian Revolution); People v. Most,
171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902); cf. Whitney v. People 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (freedom
of speech); Burleson v. United States ex rel. Workingmen's Co-operative Publisching Asrm.,
274 Fed. 749 (App. D. C. 1921), cert. denied, United States ex rel. Workingmen's Co-
operative Publishing Assn. v. Work, 260 U. S. 757 (1923) (denial of use of the mails);
CHAE, op. cit. supra note 2.
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of freedom of the press6 and a denial of liberty without due process of law.1 Under
this doctrine it has been held that no order may issue to restrain a libellous publica-
tion.s Similarly, statutes or ordinances providing for the abatement of a nuisance may
not be applied to restrain the publication of a scandalous newspaper.0 Even
attempts to restrain newspaper publication indirectly by impeding retail distribu-
tion have been declared unconstitutional.' 0 And, directly on the point of the principal
case, it has been uniformly held that a court may not restrain a newspaper from
publishing reports of judicial proceedings, even though the administration of justice
might be obstructed to the extent that the reports would possibly bias, prospective
or impanelled jurors.'1
It would seem that in the principal case the publication of an accurate report of
judicial proceedings was a benefit rather than an obstruction to the administration ofjustice and thus not even punishable under the law of contempt.1 2 For, although
aspersions on the courts, opinionated comment tending to bias jurors,18 disclosure of
secret proceedings,14 and erroneous reports of public proceedings' 0 have been held
to constitute obstructions to the administration of justice sufficient to justify punish-
6. U. S. CoNsT. Amendment I; Near v. State ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); Ex
parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S. W. 75 (1920); see Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 269
(Pa. 1805). There is also a specific clause in each state constitution guaranteeing freedom
of the press.
7. Near v. State ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press is a liberty
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
8. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. Ch. 1839); Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, Free and
Accepted Masons of Texas, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 306, 121 S. W. 178 (1909); see Pound,
supra note 3.
9. Near v. State ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); Ex parte Nell, 32 Tex. Cr. R.
275, 22 S. W. 923 (1893).
10. Dearborn Publishing Company v. Fitzgerald, 271 Fed. 479 (N. D Ohio, 1921)
(enjoining further arrests of salesmen allegedly inciting to breach of the peace by sale
of anti-Semitic newspaper); Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler, 58 Misc. Rep. 325, 111 N. Y.
Supp. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (enjoining police seizures of a newspaper under a nuisance
ordinance); Star Company v. Brush, 104 Misc. Rep. 404, 172 N. Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct.
1918) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance enabling municipal official to exercise Un-
limited discretion in withholding licenses to sell newspapers).
11. In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. 227 (1893) (leading case); Dailey v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. 94, 44 Pac. 458 (1896); Tate v. State ex rel. Raine, 132 Tenn. 131, 177
S. W. 69 (1915); Ex parte Foster, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 423, 71 S. W. 593 (1903). But see United
States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,383 at 363 (E. D. Pa. 1842); SismRTa, RIoUTr AM
PiuvzrEos or THE PaRss (1934) § 22.
12. For discussion of contempt by publication, see Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt
of Court in English Law (1935) 48 HvRe. L. Rzv. 885; Neles and King, Contempt by
Publication in the United States (1928) 28 CoL. L. Rxv. 401, 525; Fox, Tyo hsTomy ot
CONTEuPT or CouaRT (1927).
13. See Nelles and King, supra note 12, at 554.
14. United States v. Providence Tribune Company, 241 Fed. 524 (D. C. R. 1. 1917)
(disclosing secret grand jury proceedings); In re San Francisco Chronicle, 1 Cal, (2d)
630, 36 P. (2d) 369 (1934) (article purporting to disclose in advance the decision in a
pending case); Rex. v. Daily Mail (1921) 2 K. B. 733.
15. In re Providence Journal Company, 28 R. 1. 489, 68 Atl. 428 (1907) (mi-statement
of substance of court's opinion); Rex v. Daily Mail (1921) 2 K. B. 733.
Many states, including New York, make publication of false reports a contempt by
statute. See Neles and King, supra note 12, at 528, 554.
ment of the publisher thereof as in contempt of court,16 on the other hand publication
of an accurate report of public proceedings is in most states exempted by constitution 17
or statuteI8 from such punishment, and would seem to be obstructive only in that
it might inform prospective jurors of the facts of a pending action. But a juror is
subject to disqualification for prejudice which will keep him from reaching a conclusion
based on the evidence, and not for knowledge of the evidence itself.'0 Furthermore,
extensive distribution of accurate accounts of judicial proceedings may be con-
sidered an aid to proper administration of justice in that it expands the court room
to permit vicarious attendance by the general public. The right to attend a publie
trial cannot be practicably exercised by the mass of persons who are unable to leave
their daily employment in order to watch a trial. Through the medium of accurate
newspaper reports, however, all persons have an opportunity to scrutinize the activities
of their courts. This widespread observation of judicial proceedings, besides pro-
tecting the rights of defendants, serves as a check upon the possibility of corrupt
or despotic administration of justice2 0
Moreover, it would seem undesirable to curtail freedom of the press in order to
prevent obstructions to the administration of justice without first determining what is
such an "obstruction." The term, standing alone, is vague and inclusive. A reading
of the reported American cases in which publications have been punished for
contempt as obstructive of the administration of justice might give the impression
that in more than seventy-five per cent of the cases an obstruction consists of matter
which arouses the personal ire of a judge. If a similar definition were to be used
as a ground for imposing prior restraints, the value to society of a free press would
be seriously diminished. Nor does it appear that the courts have need of a power
to impose prior restraints. Except in cases of "trial by press," the newspapers do
not appear to exert any influence directly prejudicial to a defendant's rights.2 '
And it is submitted that vigorous use of the existing contempt power, after the
manner of the English courts,2 2 is adequate to curb "trial by press" without necessity
of further encroaching upon freedom of the press.23
NATURE OF PERPETUAL On. "RoYALTie'
A landowner, who was entitled to a 1/6 part of the oil being produced on his land
as "rent or royalty" under an existing oil and gas lease, granted and conveyed to the
16. The courts of New York and Pennsylvania, contrary to other jurisdictions, hold
their contempt power so restricted by statute as to be inapplicable, except in enumerated
instances, to publications outside of the court room. See People ex ret Supreme Court
v. Albertson, 242 App. Div. 450, 452, 275 N. Y. Supp. 361, 364 (4th Dept. 1934);
Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 284, 152 Atl. 33, 35 (1930).
17. See, for example, N. Y. CoxsT. art. VI, § 22.
18. See Nelles and King, supra note 12, at 528, 554.
Neither is an accurate report grounds for a libel action. Campbell v. New York Evening
Post, 245 N. Y. 320, 157 N. E.'153 (1927); Vick v. Express Publishing Company, 75
S. W. (2d) 478 (Tex. CL Civ. App. 1934).
19. Allen v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 688 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924), cert. denied, Hunter v.
United States, 267 U. S. 597 (1925) (knowledge of facts of case gained from reading
newspapers does not disqualify juror); Littrell v. State, 22 OkIa. Cr. R. 1, 209 Pac. 194
(1921) (same).
20. See Davis v. United States, 247 Fed. 394, 395 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
21. Cf. Nelles and King, supra note 12, at 545; Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E.
781 (1926) discussed in SmErs, Famoa or Tm PnEss (1935) at 336.
22. See Goodhart, loc. dt. supra note 12; Note (1932) 81 U. PA. L. Rxv. 214, 215, n. 4.
23. Cf. SEzmEs, op. cit. supra note 21, at 256 (statement by Clarence Darrow on
suffidency of the contempt power to curb "trial by press"). But cf. TA.rr, LoW Rnonzr
(1926) 142-163.
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defendant "3% landowner's royalty, being 3% of all oil, gas and other hydrocarbon
substances and/or other minerals produced, extracted and saved on" the said land,
to have and to hold unto the defendant, his heirs and assigns forever. This instru-
ment was duly recorded. The lease was terminated by a quitclaim deed from the
lessee to the landowner, defendant making no protest. Plaintiff succeeded to the
landowner's interests through.mesne conveyances in fee, and, after production of
oil had ceased, executed a new oil and gas lease. Plaintiff then brought suit to
remove as a cloud on his title defendant's claim to an interest in the oil and gas to
be produced from the land. The court refused to grant this relief, but held instead
that defendant became vested by virtue of the assignment with a perpetual undivided
interest in the mineral rights in the land, including the right to produce, and that
plaintiff took subject to this recorded interest in land. 1
Instruments worded similarly to that in the instant case have variously been held to
convey only a right to receive a percentage of the oil and gas produced under the
existing lease,2 a perpetual undivided interest in the mineral rights in the land,a or a
right to share in oil and gas produced under any lease on the land, but with no
interest in "oil in place. ' 4
By the first interpretation, which limits the assignee to part of the lessor's interest
under an existing lease, the assignee's interest is held to be protected as against the
lessor by the latter's disability to terminate the lease without the assignee's consent5
1. Callahan v. Martin, 43 P. (2d) 788 (Cal. 1935).
2. Rogers v. Jones, 40 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); cf. Jones v. Pier, 124 Cal.
App. 444, 12 P. (2d) 646 (1932); Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255 Pac. 52 (1927);
Lowe v. Kindall, 116 Ohio St. 188, 156 N. E. 119 (1927); Crowder v. James, 110 OIda. 214,
236 Pac. 891 (1925). But cf. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Hitchcock, 25 P. (2d) 867
(Cal. App. 1933).
3. Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254, 38 P. (2d) 599 (1934);
Updegraff v. Blue Creek Coal and Land Co., 74 W. Va. 316, 81 S. E. 1050 (1914); Paxton
v. Benedum Trees Oil Co., 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 472 (1917); Lockhart v. United Gas
Fuel Co., 105 W. Va. 69, 141 S. E. 521 (1928); see Note (1934) 90 A. L. R. 770, at 780;
cf. Myers v. Hines, 149 Okla. 232, 300 Pac. 309 (1931); Wilson v. Olsen, 167 Okla. 527, 30
P. (2d) 710 (1934); Hyde v. Rainey, 233 Pa. 540 (1912); Porter v. Shaw, 12 S. W. (2d)
595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
4. Arrington v. United Royalty Co., 188 Ark. 270, 65 S. W. (2d) 36 (1933); Guess v.
Harmonson, 4 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Homer v. Philadelphia Co., 71 W.
Va. 345, 76 S. E. 662 (1912); cf. Leydig v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F. (2d)
494 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Beam v. Dugan, 132 Cal. App. 546, 23 P (2d) 58 (1933);
Luman v. Davis, 108 Kan. 801, 196 Pac. 1078 (1921); Dunlap v. Jackson, 92 Okla. 246,
219 Pac. 314 (1923) ; Jackson v. Dulaney, 67 W. Va. 309, 67 S. E. 795 (1910) ; see Summers,
Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties (1931) 10 Tnx. L. Rzv. 1, at 16 ff. But
cf. Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926) (interest held limited to leases
executed by assignor only); and see McKernon v. Josey Oil Co., 106 Okla. 100, 233 Pac,
451 (1925).
It is generally held that parol evidence is admissable to explain the terms of the
instrument. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Hitchcock, 25 P. (2d) 867 (Cal. App. 1933);
GrAssmIE, Or. An GAS LEAsEs AND ROYALTIES (1935) 120. Contra: Bellport v. Harrison,
123 Kan. 310, 255 Pac. 52 (1927); Horner v. Philadelphia Co., supra. In the instant case
such evidence was excluded in the trial court.
5. Jones v. Pier, 124 Cal. App. 444, 12 P. (2d) 646 (1932); Bishop v. Sanford, 35
S. W. (2d) 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); cf. Mathews v. Ramsey-Lloyd Oil Co., 121 Kan.
75, 245 Pac. 1064 (1926). But cf. Doehring v. Gulf Production Co., 8 S. W. (2d) 723
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
and, where the assignee records his interest, he may be protected as against subse-
quent transferees of the land6 as well, on the theory that he possesses an interest in
land, in the nature of rent3 Since in the instant case oil was being produced under
the existing lease at the time of the assignment, it may be safely said that it was the
belief of the parties that exhaustion of the oil supply of the land would occur within
the duration of the lease, and so it is probable that attention was not directed to the
question of what interests should survive. However, a limitation of the assignees
interest to the existing lease would conflict with the assignment's provisioa that the
assignee should have a perpetual right to receive the percentage of production
stipulated.
Interpreting the assignment to give the assignee a perpetual interest in the
mineral rights, including the right to produce, as the court did in the instant case,
allows him to share in the creation of new leases and in the benefits receivable by
the lessor or any subsequent owners thereunder.8 But such an interpretation makes
difficult the determination of the extent of the assignee's interest on the termination
of the existing leaseP A 3% interest in the mineral rights would entitle the
assignee to only 3% of the royalty share under a new lease (that is, in the
ordinary lease, 3% of 1/8 of the oil produced) if he participated in the lease, or
3% of the total production of oil less his proportionate share of the cost of pro-
6. See N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 97-501, 502; MiLn -WLUUGm n,
LAW or On AaD GAS (1926) 237ff; Texas Sulphur Co. v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co.,
4 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925); cf. Jackson v. United Producers' Pipeline Co., 33
S. W. (2d) 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Contra: Curlee v. Anderson and Patterson, 235
S. W. 622 (Teax. Civ. App. 1921).
7. United States v. Noble, 237 U. S. 74 (1915); Pugh v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 49 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Allen v. Thompson, 169 Ark. 169, 273 S. W.
396 (1925); Chandler v. Bowman, 100 Cal. App. 221, 279 Pac. 1041 (1929); McIntire's
Adm'r v. Bond, 227 Ky. 607, 13 S. W. (2d) 772 (1929); see BMi.Ls-W=.mrrio , op. cit
supra note 6, at 173ff.; Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil
and Gas Lease (1928) 7 TEX. L. RLn. 1, at 32ff.; cf. Comment (1928) 6 T=X. L. Rnv. 236;
Musgrave v. Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302 (1920) (dissent of Poffenbarger J.).
Contra: Hulse v. Hulse, 155 Ill. App. 343 (1910); Meredith v. Meredith, 264 S. W. 1109
(Ky. 1924); O'Brien v. Jones, 239 S. W. 1013 (Tea. Civ. App. 1922), 251 S. W. 203 (Tex.
Comm. of App. 1923), 274 S. W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); see GrAss.nnr, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 57, 122; 2 THoRaToN.i, OrL Am GAS (5th ed. 1932) 644, 697. For the unusual
reasoning of the Texas courts consult: Hager v. Stakes, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S. W. 835 (1927);
Taylor v. Higgins Oil and Fuel Co., 2 S. W. (2d) 288 (Tea. Civ. App. 1928). But cf.
Ehlinger v. Clark, 117 Tex. 547, 8 S. W. (2d) 666 (1928).
8. Way v. Venus, 35 S. W. (2d) 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Smith v. Schlitter, 66 S. W.
(2d) 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); see MIiL5-W~iLLuAr, op. cit. supra note 6, at 178.
But cf. Guess v. Harmonson, 4 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). An interest in the
mineral rights is an interest in land. Gr.ssa xr, op. cit. supra note 4, at 70, and cases
there cited. Recordation thereof gives constructive notice to persons dealing with the land.
Rowland v. Grifin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S. W. (2d) 457 (1929); Moore v. Grif in, 72 Kan. 164,
83 Pac. 395 (1905) ; Lockhart v. United Gas Fuel Co., 105 W. Va. 69, 141 S. E. 521 (1928);
see M]Lhs-WI GHAfr, op. cit. supra note 6, at 235ff.
9. Typical cases of the difficulties met by the courts in this respect are the following:
Kilcoyne v. Southern Oil Co., 61 W. Va. 538, 56 S. E. 888 (1907); Manufacturer's Light
and Heat Co. v. Knapp, 102 W. Va. 308, 135 S. E. 1 (1926); Stanley v. Slone, 216 Ky.
114, 287 S. W. 360 (1926) ; Gi1ispie v. Blanton, 214 Ky. 49, 282 S. W. 1061 (1926) ; Krutz-
feld v. Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 284 Pac. 553 (1930) ; and cases cited .supra notes 2, 3 and 4.
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duction if his consent was not obtained. 10 So in either case he would get less than
the 3% of total production free of cost which the assignment purported to give
him. On the other hand, an interpretation which would give him the 3% of total
production free of cost under any new lease would result in his receiving a greater
interest than that intended to be conveyed, for he would also have the right to
share in bonus moneys and delay rentals."
Construing the assignee's interest as merely a perpetual right to receive free of
cost 3% of all oil and gas when and if produced from the land, without any share
in the bonus moneys or delay rentals of leases,12 would seem, therefore, to be the
preferable interpretation, particularly since the express words of the grant are "3%
of all oil, gas" etc., "produced, extracted and saved on" the land.13 This right is
analogous to a rent seck,14 which is said to issue out of the profits of the land,' 6 and
may be assigned as a charge thereon.'8 Whether oil produced be treated as a profit
of the land or as a severed part of the corpus, however, the theory of rent is
applicable.17 But such an interest in land carries rights essential to its realization.18
10. Gillispie v. Blanton, 214 Ky. 49, 282 S. W. 1061 (1926); Paxton v. Benedum Trees
Oil Co., 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S. E. 472 (1917); see Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 1400; Note (1934)
91 A. L. R. 205; Walker, Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas (1928) 6 Tzx. L.
R . 125, at 144-150.
11. See authorities cited supra: note 8; also see Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 97 Okla. 46,
223 Pac. 835 (1923). In the instant case the court gave no indication as to the assignee's
rights concerning bonus moneys and delay rentals of new leases.
12. See Arrington v. United Royalty Co., 188 Ark. 270, 65 S. W. (2d) 36 (1933);
,Guess v. Harmonson, 4 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
13. The question arises as to the assignee's rights in the event of production of oil by
the landowner in the absence of a lease on the land, since there would then technically be
no "royalty." At least one case has stated that the assignee could not share in such pro-
duction. Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926). However, the better rule in
a perpetual grant would seem to be to allow the assignee to share, this being, at any rate,
the evident intent gleaned from the wording of the instrument in the instant case. Cf.
Jackson v. Dulaney, 67 W. Va. 309, 67 S. E. 795 (1910). So the use of the word "royalty"
could be interpreted merely as indicating that the stated share was to be receivable free
of cost. Harris v. Cobb, 38 S. E. 559 (W. Va. 1901). The instrument is interpreted accord-
ing to the intent evidenced from its whole content rather than from particular technical
phrases. Krutzfield v. Stevenson, 86 Mont. 463, 284 Pac. 553 (1930).
14. See the dissenting opinion in Leydig v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F.
(2d) 494 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by
an Oil and Gas Lease (1928) 7 TEx. L. Ray. 1, at 32ff; Mmas-WU UoUoA, op. cit. sufpra
note 6, at 203 n. 8; cf. Beam v. Dugan, 23 P. (2d) 58 (Cal. App. 1933).
15. 2 TurrrANy, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1459-1465; 2 TnoNroN, Op. cit. supra
note 5, at 646-647; Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (1896) 10 HiAv. L.
Rav. 71 (VIII RPAL OBauOAnoNs); Williams, The Incidence of Rent (1897) 11 H-Av.
L. Rxv. 1.
16. See authorities cited supra note 15; CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 802; Clark,
Covxrs AwD IyrEm s Ru ni'rNo wnr LANm (1929) 166 ff.; Landowners' Liability to
Pay Rentcharges in Fee (1897) 13 L. Q. Rav. 288; cf. Jackson v. Dulaney, 67 W. Va. 309,
67 S. E. 795 (1910).
- 17. McIntire's Am'r v. Bond, 227 Ky. 607, 13 S. W. (2d) 772 (1929); Keen v. Bartlett,
41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E. 664 (1895); State v. Royal Mineral Ass'n, 132 Minn. 232, 156
N. W. 128 (1916); cf. United States v. Looney, 29 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929);
Arrington v. United Royalty Co., 188 Ark. 270, 65 S. W. (2d) 36 (1933) ; Pierce v. Marland
Oil Co., 86 Colo. 59, 278 Pac. 804 (1929). And see authorities cited supra note 7. It seems
It is necessary for the protection of the assignee's interest that he have not merely a
right to a portion of the oil produced, but, also, at least a limited interest in the
right to produce oil on the land.19 For he is otherwise helpless, not only where the
source of his profit is being drained by production of oil on adjoining lands, but also
where the landowner, desiring not to suffer interference with his use of the surface
for other purposes which may be of more value to him, proves recalcitrant in having
the oil resources of his land developed. So in the instant case it seems the assignee's
interest should amount to a perpetual right to receive free of cost 35 of all oil and
gas produced from the land plus the incidental right to produce if the exercise of
such right becomes essential to diligent exploitation of the oil resources of the land.
This right to produce is so limited as not to carry with it a right to participate with
the landowner in the creation of new leases. Thus, this interpretation has an
additional important advantage over the second interpretation in that it leaves the
landowner's leasing power unencumbered by the frequently extremely onerous burden
of securing the consent of all outstanding royalty assignees.20
POWER OF STATE COURT TO ENJOIN DIsCRI=ATION BY WATER CARRIERS AND
Tmm EmXPLoYFEs AGAINST ANTI-UNIoN SEhPEPs
SYMATHY of federal courts with employers in disputes with organized labor fre-
quently led employers to prefer federal to state courts in labor controversies.;
Federal jurisdiction was invoked either through diversity of citizenship created by
skillful joinder of parties or through presentation of a federal question under the
apparent that in the instant case the parties were treating the assignment as a perpztual
investment in land rather than a mere sale of oil.
18. Hyde v. Rainey, 233 Pa. 540 (1911); Hlimbler Coal Co. v. Kirk, 205 Ky. 666, 266
S. W. 355 (1924); Davison v. Reynolds, 150 Ga. 182, 103 S. E. 248 (1920); CAL. Crv. COon
(Deering, 1931) § 1084.
19. At least one jurisdiction has held that in a grant of oil and gas in place no right
of entry will be implied when not expressly given. Morgan v. McGee, 117 Ohla. 212, 245
Pac. 888 (1926); but cf. McKernon v. Josey Oil Co., 105 Okla. 100, 233 Pac. 451 (1925).
However, in most states this right will be implied. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Hitch-
cock, 25 P. (2d) 867 (Cal. App. 1933); Lovelace v. Southwestern Petroleum Co., 267 Fed.
513 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920); Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 34 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 105 (1911),
aff'd, 88 Ohio St. 594 (1913); GrASs=MI R op. cit. supra note 4, at 129ff. In the Instant
case this question was made the main point of argument by plaintiff. For a compari-
son of the interpretation of the assignee's rights favored in this note, with the right of one
entitled to crops grown on land as rent to enter and harvest them in case of refuaml
of delivery by the tenant, see, e.g., KAN. Rav. STAT. A=N. (1923) § 67-525.
20. See GLAssmamE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 265; id., at 255; cf. Doehring v. Gulf
Production Co., 8 S. W. (2d) 723 (Teax. Civ. App. 1928); Arrington v. United Royalty Co.,
188 Ark. 270, 65 S. W. (2d) 36 (1933). The hardships involved in getting all the owners
of fractional interests to join in a lease of course may fall upon one of those owners as
well as upon the landowner or prospective lessee, for delay and diflculty of leasing may
result in the oil in which he is interested being steadily drawn away by adjoining production.
The interest under the interpretation here proposed is known to the oil man as a p-rpetual
non-participating royalty.
1. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Lawlor v. Loewa,
235 U. S. 522 (1915); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); Coro-
nado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925); Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927); see Christ, The Federal Ant-
Injunction BM (1932) 26 Ian. L. Rev. 516.
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Interstate Commerce Act or under the Sherman and Clayton anti-trust acts.2
However, since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which deprives the federal
courts of power to issue temporary or permanent injunctions in certain types of
cases growing out of labor disputes,3 this trend has been reversed. A recent New
York case illustrates the efforts of employers to remain in the state courts in order
to avoid the denial of injunctive relief in the federal courts in cases to which the
Act applies.4
Plaintiff shippers, engaged in manufacturing and distributing merchandise in
interstate and foreign commerce, used non-union teamsters to transport freight to
and from the piers and terminals of the Port of New York. The longshoremen's
union, to which all longshoremen and checkers who were employed by defendant
steamship carriers belonged, combined with the teamsters' union for the purpose
of effecting complete unionization of all teamsters operating at the piers and ter-
minals of the carriers. Thus, members of the longshoremen's union refused to handle
or check any freight delivered by non-union teamsters and threatened to strike if
any attempt was made to require them to handle such freight.5 The carriers, fear-
ing a strike, acquiesced in this practice by declining to handle freight through
their terminals unless the delivery trucks supplied by the shippers were manned by
union teamsters. Consequently, the shippers were forced to hire union truckmen.
Alleging that the practice was a conspiracy between the unions and carriers to vio-
late the federal shipping and anti-trust acts and also to violate the common law
duty of a carrier to accept all goods, they sought and obtained in the Supreme Court
of New York a decree enjoining interference by the unions and requiring the car-
riers to handle their shipments without discrimination. But the Appellate Division,
reversing the lower court, dismissed the complaint on the theory that the Supreme
Court was without jurisdiction, since the unfair practice complained of was exclu-
sively either within the province of the Federal Shipping Board or, if the Shipping
Act is inapplicable, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts."
Though admiralty jurisdiction depends in contract cases upon the nature and sub-
ject matter of the contract, in tort cases the test is not the nature of, the tort, but
2. See FRANEFuRTER AND GREENE, TnE LABOR INJUNMcON (1930) 5-17. In labor cases,
federal courts often have refused to apply the distinctions between reasonable and unrea-
sonable restraints which are used to prevent the application of the anti-trust laws to intra-
state business. See Frankfurter( and Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor Injunc-
tion (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rav. 385, 391; Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1072, 1080-1084,
1086-1088; Comment (1933) 32 MIcH. L. REv. 240.
3. 47 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (1932).
4. But cf. In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Ohio,
1935), noted in (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1140 (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 372, where an injunc-
tion was granted to protect property in bankruptcy proceedings despite the Norris-La-
Guardia Act.
5. The unions' actions were impersonal; there was no attempt to ruin plaintiffs' busi-
ness. The refusals to handle freight were not made to any particular concern, but rather
to all concerns whose trucks drove on the piers operated by non-union drivers. There
were no acts of violence, nor was there damage or threat of damage to tangibld property.
The purpose of this combination was to better general working conditions by maintaining
the union wage rate, which was higher than the non-union rate.
6. New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 154 Misc. 747, 277 N. Y. Supp. 519 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
7. New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 245 App. Div. 262, 281 N. Y. Supp4 647
(2d Dep't, 1935).
[Vol. 45
the place where it happened.8  Thus, if the tort is committed on navigable waters,
it falls, regardless of its nature, under maritime jurisdiction, while if it is committed
on land, no admiralty jurisdiction exists. Consequently, since the cause of action
in the principal case arose from the torts of carriers and their employees commit-
ted on land, the opinion of the Appellate Division seems erroneous insofar as it is
based upon the conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction existed.
The chief contention of the labor unions, however, was that the Federal Shipping
Board had exclusive original jurisdiction of this case. Since orders of the Board
are enforceable only in the federal courts,9 the unions would receive protection
from the Norris-LaGuardia Act by establishing primary jurisdiction in the Board.
The Federal Shipping Board is granted broad supervisory powers over common car-
riers by water in interstate and foreign commerce and also over persons ".... carry-
ing on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other
terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water ... " for the pur-
pose of regulating their activity.10 Since Congress has the power to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce completely,1" it is clear that Congress can give the
Shipping Board exclusive control over all common carriers by water in interstate
and foreign commerce. Whether that power has been exercised to the extent of
depriving the courts of jurisdiction over such a case as the instant one has not been
definitely decided1 2 But under the Interstate Commerce Act,'5 vhich closely
parallels the Shipping Act both in scope and in purpose,' 4 preliminary resort to the
8. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 (1914); North Pacific S. S. Co.
v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U. S. 119 (1919); State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co.,
259 U. S. 263 (1922); see 1 BEEDICr, ADn.mrA=T (5th ed. 1925) §§ 2, 61, 127; HuGcms,
AD=mALYT (2d ed. 1920) 18.
9. "In case of violation of any order of the board, ... the board, or any party injured
by such violation . . . may apply to a district court having jurisdiction of the parties;
and if, after hearing, the court determines that the order was regularly made and duly
issued, it shall enforce obedience thereto by a writ of injunction or other propar
process .. ." 39 STAT. 737 (1916), 46 U. S. C. A. § 828 (1926).
10. 39 STAT. 728 (1916), 46 U. S. C. A. § 801 (1926). For a complete discuson of
the history and activities of the Board, see United States Shipping Board-Service Mono-
graphs, U. S. Gov't, No. 63 (1931).
11. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.
352 (1913); see 2 Coo.EY, CoNsnrrnoNAL L=AxwrAo.qs (8th ed. 1927) 1274.
12. Very few cases discuss the jurisdiction of the Shipping Board. It has been held
that questions of discriminatory rates must be heard before the Board. United States Navi-
gation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U. S. 474 (1932); Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique v. American Tobacco Co., 31 F. (2d) 663 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); cf. Prince Line
v. American Paper Exports, 55 F. (2d) 1053 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Also, the Board has
jurisdictign over the question of the use of "fighting ships?" Wisconsin & M. T. Co. v.
Pere Marquette L. S, 67 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Wisconsin & M. T. Co. v. Pere
Marquette L. S., 210 Wis. 391, 245 N. W. 671 (1932). And in 1920, a shippar sought
and obtained in the state court injunctive relief against a conspiracy quite similar to the
one in the principal case. However, no question of jurisdiction of the Shipping Board was
raised. Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1920),
114 Misc. 673, 187 N. Y. Supp. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
13. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-27 (1926).
14. "The Shipping Act is a comprehensive measure bearing a relation to common car-
riers by 'water substantially the same as that borne by the Interstate Commerce Act to
interstate common carriers by land?' Sutherland, J., in United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard
S. S. Co., 284 U. S. 474, at 480 (1932). See, also, Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
v. American Tobacco Co., 31 F. (2d) 663, 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
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Interstate Commerce Commission is required only when a rule or practice is attacked
as unreasonable or discriminatory, and not when a fair rule has been unequally
applied.15 Though this distinction may seem to be but verbal, it illustrates the
function of such an administrative board. Its primary purpose is to determine fair
rules of practice, and thus to promote uniformity of regulation,16 after expert
consideration of the complex and technical questions involved. When such rules
have been established, no further exercise of administrative discretion is required. 17
In the principal case, it appears that the complaint was based on an alleged viola-
tion of the rule to accept all freight, the validity of which, as a rule, none of the
parties contested.' 8 Consequently, since analysis of the purpose of the board reveals
that no administrative finding is necessary in this case, the opinion of the Appellate
Division, insofar as it is based upon the conclusion that the Shipping Board had
exclusive jurisdiction, seems questionable.' 0
Should the Court of Appeals conclude that the case is cognizable in the first
instance in the courts and is not within the admiralty jurisdiction, the state and
federal courts probably would have concurrent jurisdiction 2 0 However, since no
15. Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121 (1915); Illinois Central
Rr. Co. v. Mulberry Coal Co., 238 U. S. 275 (1915); Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Sonman
Coal Co., 242 U. S. 120 (1916); see 2 SHA~rAFT, TmH INTERSTArE COMMERCE CoM s-
sIo" (1931) 393-406.
Whether complainant is privileged to resort to the Commission In such cases seems
never to have been decided. See Vulcan Coal & Mining Co. v. Illinois Central Rr., 33
I. C. C. 52, 63, 64 (1915). HoweverA the decisions seem to indicate that the jurlsdiction
of the courts is exclusive. Wells & Son v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co., 161 I. C. C. 145
(1930); cf. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70 (1912);
United States v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 242 U. S. 208 (1916); In re Transportation, etc.)
of Fruit, 10 I. C. C. 360 (1904).
16. See Texas & Pac. Rr. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 440 (1907);
Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184, 196 (1913); Great North-
ern Rr. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 290 (1922).
17. See 2 SHAnxAx, op. cit. supra note 15, at 402.
18. Yet the Appellate Division held that the gravamen of the action was the rule pro-
mulgated by the carriers to deal with shippers only if their trucks were manned by union
men, and consequently that an administrative board should determine the fairness of this
rule.
However, since the carriers desired to service trucks at all times irrespective of whether
their drivers were union or non-union and even did so except insofar as they were pre-
vented by the acts of the union defendants, it seems inaccurate to hold that the carriers
established this rule to deal only with union-manned trucks.
19. Even if it is assumed that the Shipping Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the
carriers, it is questionable whether the Board has power to regulate the activity of the
employees of the carriers. Since only ". . . common carriers by water .. ." and other
persons ". . . carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing ...terminal facilities
... are subject td the Shipping Act, it may be argued that employees of carriers are not
included. However, the only'case found on this point held that the act was broad enough
to include employees. Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 114 Misc. 673, 187 N. Y. Supp. 873 (Sup.
Ct. 1921).
20. Plaintiff's complaint alleges facts which constitute violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, the Shipping Act, and the common law obligation of a carrier. No state
court may enjoin a violation of the anti-trust acts. General Investment Co. v. Lake
Shore & M. S. Rr., 260 U. S. 261 (1922). Yet, since rights arising under federal laws
are enforceable in a state court as well as in a federal court unless exclusive jurisdiction
attempt was made to remove to the federal courts, 21 the Norris-LaGuardia Act
would be no obstacle to an injunction, and it would seem that under the New York
law plaintiffs would be entitled to such relief.2 2
Since almost all disputes concerning a carrier's refusal to handle goods will nec-
essarily affect interstate or foreign commerce, the labor unions will ordinarily be
able, by timely steps, to have the case removed to the federal courts and thus
receive the benefit of applications of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But their right to
remove may be circumvented if the statement of the case in the complaint can be
so framed as to allege no burden on interstate or foreign commerce nor violation
of any federal law.P It seems likely that relief could be predicated on violation
and conspiracy to cause violation of the carrier's common law duty not to discrim-
inate, unless Congress in its regulation of carriers has abrogated that duty.2 And
is reserved to the federal courts [Claflin v. Houseman, Assgnee, 93 U. S. 130 (1876)], a
state court may enjoin a violation of the Shipping Act. Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 112
Msc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1920). Also, a state court may by mandamus
order a carrier to render service. Missouri Pacific Rr. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612
(1909). The presence of an exclusive federal remedy under the anti-trust acts should
not preclude the enforcement of the other two rights in the appropriate jurizdictions.
In 1920, in a labor dispute quite similar to the one in the principal case, the aggrieved
shippers obtained injunctive relief in both state and federal courts. Buyer v. Guillan, 271
Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, supra.
21. By seeking a reversal in a state appellate court of a decision against them, defend-
ants waive their right to remove. Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U. S. 142 (1893); see Removal
Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 473 (1879); DoME, FEDERAL Pocmruvn (1928) 352.
22. Were no common carriers involved in the principal case, the New York law
probably would not permit an injunction to issue. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117
N. E. 582 (1917); Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, 240 App. Div. 718, 265 N. Y. Supp.
624 (2d Dep't, 1933). But cf. Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E.
97 (1919). However, it seems that a different rule applies when a common carrier is
involved. Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 114 Misc. 673, 187 N. Y. Supp. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1921);
see Reardon v. Caton, 189 App. Div. 501, 511, 178 N. Y. Supp. 713, 719 (2d Dep't, 1919).
The Court of Appeals may decide to enjoin only the officers of the carriers, thus forcing
them to hire new men should the present employees continue recalcitrant. Or, following
the Burgess case, it may enjoin all defendants on the theory of a conspiracy. For a com-
plete discussion of the New York cases, see Comment (1934) 9 ST. Jom;'s L. REv. 171.
Shortly after entry of judgment in the trial court, the New York Anti-Injunction Act
was passed. N. Y. LAws 1935, c. 477; N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 876-a (Quinn-Neustein
Act); see Comment (1935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 92; Legis. (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 83.
This Act, modelled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, would seem to prevent the injunctive
relief secured by plaintiff in the trial court, were it not inapplicable to injunctions dated
prior to enactment. Kronowitz v. Schlansky, 156 Misc. 717, 282 N. Y. Supp. 564 (Sup.
Ct. 1935); cf. Mlicamold Radio Corp. v. Beede, 156 Misc. 390, 282 N. Y. Supp. 77
(Sup. Ct. 1935); see (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 1147. But cf. American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v. Gottfreid, N. Y.
L. J., July 2, 1935, at 18, col. 3.
23. Presence of a federal question is to be determined only by examination of the
complaint. See DOME, FEDERAL PRocEmu 359; 4 HuGHEs, FnEAr.A Piscrrca (1931)
§ 2318; 1 LOxGsDORP, CxcroPmxiA OF FEDERAL PaOCEDURE (1928) § 198.
24. Apparently the fact that there is a coextensive duty under federal law does not
make removal available. "It is obvious that not every case by or against an interstate
carrier arises under the Interstate Commerce Law or involves any violation of it. Some
which might be pleaded under it may also be pleaded under the common law of carriers.
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since the Interstate Commerce Act expressly provides that existing common law
remedies are not to be abridged, 25 it is clear that this obligation survives so far as
the carriers regulated by that Act are concerned. 20 But the omission of such a pro-
vision from the Shipping Act may be interpreted as an indication of Congressional
intent to make federal regulation of carriers by water complete and exclusive. Yet,
since such a statute will not ordinarily be construed as taking away a common law
right unless such intention is manifest,27 it seems that it should not be implied
from silence. The continuing existence of this right may thus prove a device to
restrict the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in such a case. However, a
court unwilling to reach this result might seize on the suggestion thrown out by
the Appellate Division in the instant case that even if the state courts have juris-
diction to issue an injunction, they should be guided in the decision of a matter
falling within Congress' regulatory powers by the policy expressed by Congress in
Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and in the exercise of their sound discretion
refuse relief.
28
PowER OF BANKRUPTCY COURT TO ENJOIN A STRIKING LABOR UNION NOTWITII-
STANDING THE NOms-LA GuARDIA AcT.
IT was in the extraordinary protection granted by federal judges to railroads under-
going receivership, that the labor injunction had its modem origin.1 During the
railway strikes of 1877, workers who prevented the trains from running were jailed
on the ground that their disturbance of the possession of the receiver was a contempt
of the authority of the court.2 The extension of this remedy to all businesses was
a natural transition in the period of American industrial expansion.8 Proposals to
Thus the federal jurisdiction of this class of cases is more or less a matter of pleading, and
of the emergence of a federal commerce question from plaintiff's pleading." 1 LoNos-
DOR, op. cit. supra note 23, at 883, 884.
In a suit for damages for a common carrier's refusal to furnish cars, plaintiff deliberately
refrained from alleging that the goodd affected were to go into interstate commerce. The
court held that plaintiffs were privileged to depend upon the common law in lieu of federal
statutes, and that thd case was not removable. Bundick v. New York, P. & N. Rr. Co.,
17 F. (2d) 487 (E. D. Va. 1926).
25. 24 STAT. 387 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 22 (1926).
26. Missouri Pacific Rr. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612 (1909); Pennsylvania Rr. v.
Puritan Coal Co., 237 U. S. 121 (1915); Kells Mill & Lumber Co. v. Pennsylvania Rr.
Co., 89 N. J. L. 490, 98 Atl. 309 (1916), aff'd, 90 N. J. L. 325, 100 Atl. 1070 (1917);
Aldrich v. Southern Rr. Co., 95 S. C. 427, 79 S. E. 316 (1913); see 1 LoNosDoon, op, cit.
supra note 23, at § 34; (1909) 57 U. oF PA. L. REV. 475.
27. Chicago & N. W. Rr. Co. v. Whitnack Produce Co., 258 U. S. 369 (1922); see
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533 (1912); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRUcnoN
(2d ed. 1904) §§ 573-575.
28. It can be argued, on the other hand, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, since It is
directed only at the jurisdiction of the federal courts, was intended simply to leave liti-
gation of labor disputes to the state courts, not to control the results there reached. But
this view can be maintained only by, disregarding Section 2.
1. Nelles, A Strike and its Legal Consequences (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 507.
2. Secor v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 12,605, at 968 (N. D. Ill. 1877);
King v. Ohio & M. Ry. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 7,800, at 539 (D. Ind. 1877); Nelles, supra note 1.
3. Thomas v. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. S. D, Ohio 1894) was the
last contempt case based on the receivership doctrine. In the same year the employees
curtail it materialized in the Clayton Act,4 which restricted injunctive relief against
labor to cases where necessary to prevent irreparable injury. But the protection
which this law purported to grant labor was vitiated by its narrow interpretation
by the courts.5 Demand for reform over a period of years resulted in the passage
in 1932 of the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act.0 This statute deprives
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue restraining orders in labor disputes, except in
certain specified instances, and then, only in strict conformity with its procedural
provisions. In the few cases which have arisen under this law, its restrictions have
been held binding, and it has proved effective to curb intervention by the federal
courts in labor controversies But a recent order of a bankruptcy court,8 enjoining
labor interference with the property under its control, notwithstanding the Act,
raises the question whether such a court was intended to come within its purview.
A month after the Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Company filed its petition for
reorganization under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, in the Federal District
Court, its unionized workers went out on strike. As a result, the beer in the vats
could not be bottled, and attempts to remove it to prevent deterioration were
successfully frustrated by the strikers. Thereupon application for relief was made
to the court, which treated the proceedings not as arising out of a labor dispute, but
as for the preservation of the debtor's assets pending reorganization. And, on the
ground that the Norris-La Guardia Act did not apply to deprive the bankruptcy
court of power to restrain interference with property under its jurisdiction, the union
was enjoined from obstructing the removal of the beer.
It does not seem that, by any reasonable interpretation of the Norris-La Guardia
Act, a federal bankruptcy court should be considered as outside the scope of its
restrictions. For the term "court of the United States" as used therein, is speci-
fically defined to mean "any court of the United States whose jurisdiction has been
or may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress."0 Since federal
of a railroad under receivership were enjoined from striking, not on the receivership doc-
trine, but on the court's general equity' power to enjoin illegal acts. Arthur v. Oahes, 63
Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894). The Debs case, in the came year, definitely established
"government by injunction' United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1894).
See Nelles, supra note 1.
4. Section 20, 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1926). Such proposals had
occupied the attention of Congress during every session but one in the tv:enty years
between 1894 and 1914. See Brandeis, J., dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 354,
368-370 (1921); FRA-ruRTER AND GREENE, Tim LA3OR INTom;cr.: (1930) c. IV.
5. FhnaaRTzR AND GR 'E, op. cit. supra note 4.
6. 47 STAr. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (1934), noted in (1932) 30 Mxc .
L. REv. 1257.
7. Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Union, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich.
1934); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Knapp-
Monarch Co. v. Anderson, 7 F. Supp. 332 (E. D. I1. 1934); United States v. Weirton Steel
Co., 7 F. Supp. 255 (D. Del. 1934) (court held without jurisdiction of suit by United
States to enjoin coercion of defendant's employees in electing representatives); Miller
Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture W. I. Union, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D. N. J. 1934); United
Electric Coal Companies v. Rice, 9 F. Supp. 635 (E. D. Ill. 1934); Dean v. Mayo, 9 F.
Supp. 459 (W. D. La. 1934) (longshoremen enjoined from acts of violence after com-
plainant had complied with provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act); Progressive Minrs
of America v. Peabody Coal Co., 75 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) (labor union denied
an injunction against employer).
8. In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Ohio 1935).
9. Section 13(d), 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 113(d) (1934).
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bankruptcy courts are creatures of statute, 10 and possess only the jurisdiction con-
ferred upon them by Congress," their inclusion within this definition does not seem
to admit of doubt.
Nor is the fact that the court's only purpose was to preserve the property under
its control any reason for excepting such an injunction from the purview of the
Act. For since practically the only purpose of any labor injunction is the protection
of property, the very design of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to take away this
type of protection as against labor. And although the court's intent in issuing
the injunction may not have been to deprive the workers of their strike weapon
in collective bargaining, its effect was precisely that. Thus, the innocence of pur-
pose behind the injunction has no bearing whatever upon the issue, or upon the
social policy which denies employers that remedy as against labor.
Nor does the submission of corporate property to the control of a bankruptcy
court change the equities of the situation. The corporation after filing its petition
for reorganization is nevertheless the same entity as before, operated for the same
purpose-the profit of private individuals. No additional interests arise upon the
filing of the petition which would justify granting it relief to which it was not entitled
prior thereto.' 2 Nor is the bankruptcy court relieved of its duty to comply
with the labor policy declared by Congress' 3 merely because it, rather than the
ordinary management, is administering the corporate business. The court should
require of itself the same circumspection in complying with the law as it demands
of private individuals.14 The result of the instant case seems to make the statutory
protection of labor's rights dependent upon the character of the employer or the
court in which it seeks relief.' 5 Thus, the court's reasoning would seem to be a
reversion back to the extraordinary doctrine of the early receivership cases, a
result which the Norris-La Guardia Act was thought to have precluded.
10. Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11 (1926).
11. Burton Coal Co. v. Franklin Coal Co., 67 F. (2d) 796, 797 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
12. Cf. Note, (1935) 35 CoL. L. Rxv. 1140, 1142.
13. The Norris-La Guardia Act declared, as the public policy of the United States,
that the individual worker should have "full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of his own choosing, . . . and that he shall be free
from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . § 2,
47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 102 (1934).
14. Cf. Comment (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rav. 882, 891.
15. Cf. Cooley, New Aspects of the Right of Trial by Jury (1877) 25 Am. L. Ro.
lo5, 719-720. This article made a strong protest against the assumption, in 1877, by the
federal courts administering the railroads, of extraordinary powers to punish for contempt.
"A riot on the New York Central Railroad which interferes with the running of its trains
is only a riot; but on the Erie Railroad it is a contempt of the Court of Chancery. In
the one case only a jury can deal with it, and twelve men must agree concerning its legal
bearings; in the other a single judge may administer summary punishment. This may be a
useful power, but it is an enormous power, and it is not surrounded by the usual securi-
ties which protect individual liberty." It was thought that the exercise of such authority
"ought not to depend on a circumstance that in no manner affects the degree of offence
or the just rights of the accused to a deliberate and careful trial." See CARDozo, NATrun
or m JUDICraAL PRoczss (1921) Lecture III.
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PnovAnTrY iN BANXRUrTCY or BAxN STOCKHOrDER'S LrTrmaLY To AssEsSIME-T
Frvn months after defendant's discharge in bankruptcy, an assessment was levied
against him as last owner of record of certain stock in an insolvent national b:an
This bank had discontinued business two years before filing of the defendant's petition
in bankruptcy, having transferred all its assets to another national bank under an
agreement whereby the latter undertook to, and did satisfy all of the transferors
liabilities and the former agreed to make good any loss thereby suffered. When a
deficiency resulted, the transferor bank was declared insolvent and the assessment
made. In a suit by the receiver of the insolvent bank to recover the assessment, de-
fendant set up his discharge in bankruptcy as a bar. But the court, although the
defendant in his petition in bankruptcy had scheduled the bank stock as an asset and
his liability to assessment thereon as a debt, gave summary judgment for plaintiff
receiver on the ground that the liability to assessment was not a provable debt at
the time of filing of the defendant's petition in bankruptcy and was therefore not
included within the discharge.1
Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "the discharge in bankruptcy shall
release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts."2 As defined in section 63a,
provable debts include, inter alia, debts which are "a fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of
the petition against him whether then payable or not . . ."; and debts which are
"founded upon a contract express or implied."3 Hence, to determine that a claim
was a provable debt at the time of the filing of the petition, and therefore discharged,
it is necessary to demonstrate, first, that it was a "debt" within the meaning of
section 63a at that time,4 and, secondly, that it fell within one of the definitional
categories mentioned, and was therefore "provable."
Since the liability to assessment matures as soon as the bank is insolvent, it can
be argued that upon the happening of that event a "debt" within the meaning of
section 63a has arisen.5  But section 63a contemplates adjudication by the bankruptcy
court of the existence of the "debt" to which it refers. The reasonable interpretation
of the term "debt" as there employed, therefore, would include only those obligations
which are fairly susceptible of determination by the court.0  And while the bank is
1. Slaughter v. Brown (D. N. 3. 1935), reported in 12 Ai amn.Ax B muurcv REv. 23,
52 (1935).
2. There are certain exceptions not here relevant. 30 STAT. 550 (1898) as amended 42
STAT. 354 (1922), 11 U. S. C. A. § 35 (1926).
3. The section in part a further provides five other clases of provable debts and in part
b provides for the liquidation of unliquidated but provable debts. 30 STAT. 562 (1893) as
amended 48 STAT. 991 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (1934). The classes of debts so provided
are distinct and the requirement in one class for a "fixed liability . . . absolutely owing,"
is not required of a debt "founded upon contract express or implied." See Maynard v.
Elliot, 283 U. S. 273, 277 (1931), noted in (1932) 7 LD. L. J. 254; (1932) 30 Micrr. L. Rnv.
614; (1931) 80 U. op PA. L. R.v. 124.
4. Obviously, § 1 (11) [30 STAT. 544 (1898); 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1926)] which defines
debts to include "any debt ... provable in bankruptcy" is of no utility in an analysis of
§ 63a (see note 3, spra) in order to determine whether a particular obligation can come
within the latter's provisions.
S. Cf. Foster v. Lincoln, 74 Fed. 382 (C. C. D. Vt. 1896); Van Tuyl v. Schwab, 174
App. Div. 665, 161 N. Y. Supp. 323 (Ist Dep't, 1916) afd, 220 N. Y. 661, 116 N. E. 1031
(1917).




doing business, it would not be practically feasible or expedient to litigate its solvency
whenever a stockholder is adjudicated a bankrupt. Liability to assessment, therefore,
should be held to be converted into a "debt" only when the bank has closed its doors.,
But the fact that the obligation is a "debt" within the meaning of section 63a,
after the bank has closed its doors, does not mean necessarily that it is "provable."
Thus, although it would seem clearly "provable" where an assessment or judicial
declaration of insolvency has been made after the bank has closed its doors, since in
such a case the assessment debt becomes a "fixed liability . . . absolutely owing,"8
the question is not as easily settled where, as in the instant case, there has not been
an assessment or adjudication of insolvency. Here, the result depends on whether
the obligation comes within the other definitional category of "provable" debts men-
tioned, that is, "founded upon contract express or implied." That it comes within
the latter definition 9 is indicated by the fact that, although the stockholder's liability
has sometimes been considered purely statutory,' 0 it is generally held contractual for
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, on the ground that the stockholder voluntarily
assumes the obligation on becoming owner.
The objection that a holding of this character may involve administrative difficulties
in attempting to ascertain the amount of the debt seems inconclusive, for Section 63b,8
in providing for the liquidation of provable debts, clearly indicates that, unless the
debt is not susceptible of liquidation, the fact that its exact amount is as yet unfixed
affords no basis for refusing to regard the debt as "provable." 11 Liquidation may be
accomplished either by proof in the bankruptcy court of the bank's assets and
liabilities,'2 or by prolonging the bankruptcy proceedings until an assessment is made. 13
Thus, it would seem that the court in the instant case could have found ample
legal justification for holding the assessment debt to have been discharged by the
adjudication in bankruptcy. That it should have so held is suggested by the accepted
7. See Murray v. Sill, 7 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); McClelland v. Merchants and
Miners Bank, 77 Colo. 302, 236 Pac. 774 (1925); cf. Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27 (1887);
Glenn v. Dorsheimer, 23 Fed. 695 (C. C. E. . Mo. 1885).
8. See Dight v. Chapman, 44 Ore. 265, 271, 75 Pac. 585, 587 (1904); BLAox, BANxRUi1'T="
(4th ed. 1926) 705, 1517; 2 RmmIoIox, BANxMRupc (3d ed. 1923) 252. See also note 3,
supra.
9. Cases so holding: In re Rouse, 1 Am. B. R. 393 (N. D. Ohio, 1898); Cunningham v.
Commissioner of Banks, 249 Mass. 401, 144 N. E. 447 (1924); Van Tuyl v. Schwab, 174
App. Div. 665, 161 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1st Dep't, 1916), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 661, 116 N. E. 1081
(1917).
10. See McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 161 (1905); Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U. S.
216, 225 (1906); Hendrickson v. Helmer, 7 F. Supp. 627, 628 (S. D. Idaho, 1934). But
see Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521, 525 (1900) ; Seabury v. Green, 294 U. S. 165, 168 (1935)
noted in (1935) 44 YAr L. 3. 1272.
11. See Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549, 556 (1915);
Maynard v. Elliot, 283 U. S. 273, 278 (1931). See also Comment (1931) 31 COL. L. R.v.
1348.
12. Irons v. Manufacturers' National Bank, 17 Fed. 308 (C. C. N. D. Inl. 1883), 27 Fed.
591 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1886); see United States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422, 425 (1880); In re
Rouse, 1 Am. B. R. 393, 409 (N. D. Ohio, 1898).
13. See Carey v. Mayer, 79 Fed. 926, 928 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897); Irons v. Manufacturers'
National Bank, 17 Fed. 308, 314 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1883), 27 Fed. 591, 594 (C. C. N. D, Ill,
1886); In re Rouse, 1 Am. B. R. 393, 409 (N. D. Ohio, 1898).
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doctrine14 that doubts as to the provability of an obligation in bankruptcy are to be
resolved in favor of the bankrupt.15
PowEn or FEDERAL COURT TO PiusE BID PRICE IN FoREcLoSUE WITHouT
ORDERI G RESALE
AT A foreclosure sale ordered by a federal district court two bridges, valued at
$290,000, were sold for $50,000 to the bondholders' protective committee which repre-
sented 99% of the outstanding bonds. Several minority bondholders objected to con-
firmation of the sale on various grounds including gross inadequacy of price. The
court found the price inadequate, but confirmed the sale after the court's condition of
confirmation, namely that the protective committee increase its bid to $100,000, was
met. On appeal by the minority bondholders, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the order of confirmation, holding that,
since the trial court had in effect set aside the original sale and immediately held a
second sale, there had been a failure to comply with the statute,' which provided for
a public sale at the county court house or on the premises after four weeks' notice.2
The statute does not expressly or impliedly prohibit conditional confirmation of
foreclosure sales. It therefore seems unnecessarily technical to require the court in
the event of an inadequate bid to order that a second sale be held in compliance with
the statutory requirement,3 for no interested party would be injured by the different
procedure adopted in the instant case. Clearly the protective committee could not
complain of the conditional confirmation, since it could demand a resale instead, if
it so chose. Nor could the dissenting bondholders in any case have been injured
14. See Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. S49, SS4 (1915);
Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium As., 240 U. S. 581, 591 (1916); Maynard v.
Elliot, 283 U. S. 273, 277 (1931).
15. The court in the instant case seems to have been influenced by solicitude for the
depositors of the transferee bank, which had also gone into insolvency. See Slaughter v.
Brown (D. N. J. 1935) reported in (1935) 12 Airmcm; BnAumxRucY REv. 23, at 26.
1. 27 STAT. 751, §§ 1, 3 (1893), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 847, 849 (1926).
2. Bovay v. Townsend, 78 F. (2d) 343 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). The s-ale of the bridges
as a single unit rather than as separate parcels was also held invalid.
3. Though it has been held that on motion to confirm a foreclosure sale the court's sole
power is to confirm the sale or to set it aside and order a resale, Kinnear & Wi v. Lee
& Reynolds, 28 Aid. 488 (1868); Green v. State Bank, 9 Neb. 165, 2 N. W. 228 (1879);
Fitch v. insbhall, 15 Neb. 328, 18 N. W. 80 (1883); Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Goodwin,
10 Ohio St. 557 (1860), during the past few years of economic depresson, accompanied by
a total absence of competitive bidding for real estate, several state courts have approved
trial court orders confirming foreclosure sales on the condition that the mortgagee, who has
been the sole bidder at the sale, credit the fair value of the property on the deficiency
judgment. Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166
Ad. 538 (1933); John Davis Estate, Inc. v. Rochelle, 42 P. (2d) 788 (Wash. 1935);
Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933). And see Gordon State
Bank v. Hinchley, 117 Neb. 211, 220 N. W. 243 (1928) (where an inadequate price is bid,
the court may allow the bidder to increase his bid at the hearing for confirmation) ; Nerv
Jersey Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Savemore Realty Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 478, 153 Ad. 420
(1931) (confirming sale unless a prospective purchaser deposits $25,000 with court or fur-
nishes bond assuring court that $25,000 'will be bid at resale, in which case a resale will be
ordered).
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for the original- sale was held in compliance with the statute, thus affording ample
opportunity at that time for other groups to bid in the property. And if the dis-
senting bondholders, after the original sale, actually discovered someone willing to bid
more than the protective committee, the court could have received additional bids at
the confirmation proceedings without the necessity of again complying with the
statutory formalities. 4 But in most cases the likelihood is that the resale would result
in the property being sold for the price which the court had stated it would approve;
so that the dissenting bondholders could gain nothing except the increase of their
nuisance value by the delay.
The procedure of the instant case is analogous to the correction of jury verdicts
by means of a remittitur or its complement, an "additur."' 5 Remittiturs are generally
approved as a proper method of allowing a plaintiff to avoid the expense and delay
of further litigation, 6 which was the purpose of the procedure of the trial court in the
instant case. Although an additur has recently been held an unconstitutional de-
privation of the right to a trial by jury,7 no such objection is applicable to the con-
ditional confirmation of foreclosure sales by a court of equity.8 Furthermore since
the foreclosure sale of the property of a large corporation is a mere formality,0 except
in rare cases where there are several competing committees, the statutory requirements
of notice and place of sale should not be too strictly construed,10 especially where the
only tangible result is to delay the reorganization.
The procedure in the instant case, which in effect is equivalent to fixing an upset
price after the sale, has several advantages over the naming of an upset price in
the original decree.11 For where a high upset price is named which the reorganiza-
4. Blanks v. Farmers' Loan Co., 122 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. Sth, 1903); see Investment
Registry v. Chicago, M. E. Rr. Co., 212 Fed. 594, 611 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); see 7 FLETCHER,
CYc.oPEDiA CopoRArioNs (1931) § 3323; TRACY, CoOPRATr FoaRcLosuR s (1929) § 241.
5. TRACY, CoRPoRATE FoRncrosnazs (1929) § 241. For a detailed discussion of the use
of remittiturs and additurs in damage suits see Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 318.
6. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69 (1889); Brohammer v.
Lager, 194 S. W. 1072 (Mo. App. 1917); Silverglade v. Van Rohr, 107 Ohio St. 75, 140
N. E. 669 (1923); Duaine v. Gulf Refining Co., 285 Pa. 81, 131 At. 654 (1926).
7. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 (1935).
8. The Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury only in suits at common law.
U. S. CoNsT. Amendment VII. For a discussion of the flexible powers of a court of equity
in foreclosure suits see Carey, Brabner-Smith, and Sullivan, Studies in Realty Mortgage
Foreclosure: IV. Reorganization (1933) 27 ILL. L. Rv. 849.
9. 15 FLETCHER, CicLoPEDiA CoRpo.A ioNs (1932) § 7271; RosENBERG, SwAiH', WAL=tn,
CoRpoRATE REORGANIZATION AN THE FEEA a CouvRT (1924) 5, 7, 95; Frank, Reflections on
Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L. REy. 541, 554, 563; SEr=r, Corporate Reorgan-
izations: Defects and a Remedy (1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 75; Weiner, Conflicting Functions
of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 132.
10. Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International C. E. Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A.
2d, 1933), where it was held that a sale after hearings on a show cause order, notice of
which was given merely by sending circulars to the creditors, constituted a public sale with
competitive bidding. See also Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Adriance Machine Works,
Inc., 68 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), where it was held proper for the trial court
to ask for bids in open court after giving notice to the interested parties.
11. For a general discussion of the upset price see 15 FLETCHER, CycLorEmrA Conx'oRATioNs
(1932) § 7272; Colin, Reorganization by Decree (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 225; Frank, supra
note 9; Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 489;
Weiner, supra note 9.
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tion committee is unable to meet at the original sale, the court must order a resale
since there is a possibility that someone might have refrained from participating in
the original sale who would have participated if the upset price had not been so
high.-2 On the other hand, it is possible that in certain instances the upset price
may be lower than the price which the reorganization committee would have bid in
the absence of an upset price, thus prejudicing the dissenting bondholders. More-
over, some courts, believing that they should not make an anticipatory ruling on
a bid, refuse to name upset prices.' 3 The holding of the instant case, if followed,
makes it mandatory to fix an upset price in the original decree if there is to be
any control over the price other than the slow, cumbersome method of refusing con-
firmation and ordering a resale.
Srrus or S'AREs OF STOCK UNDER THE UNIORIA STOCK TRANSPER ACT
Ta common-law view that shares of stock are merely choses in action having no
situs apart from the corporate domicile and that the certificates are only some evidence
of the shareholders' interest still finds considerable support, despite the more recently
developed attitude that stock certificates themselves are property like other chattels.1
Wherever the older view still obtains it is necessary to get jurisdiction in rem over
the shares at the corporate domicile rather than where the certificate is found in order
conclusively to determine ownership of the interest in the corporation.2 And a
judgment rendered elsewhere determining rights in the certificate need not be recog-
nized by the courts at the corporate domicile as fixing the claim against the corporation.
3
Therefore the New York Court of Appeals, taking the orthodox common-law view,
ruled in Holmes v. Camp that it could entertain an action in rem against an executor
in another state concerning the ownership of shares in a New York corporation,
although both the defendant and the stock certificates were outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.4 In a recent New York case, the ancillary executor of a
Missouri decedent sued the domiciliary executor to establish his right to administer
stock in a New York corporation. The certificates were located at the decedent's
Missouri domicile, and service was had on the Missouri executor only by publication,
but the New York court, relying on Holmes v. Camp, decided it had jurisdiction in
12. Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Cambril, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S. W. (2d) 39 (1935).
Cf. Fearon v. Bankers' Trust Co., 238 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916) (upset price reduced
prior to sale where reorganization committee could not meet original upset price); Mc-
Clintic-Marshall Co. v. Scandinavian-American Building Co., 296 Fed. 601 (C. C. A. 9th,
1924).
13. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chicago, MI. St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d)
434, 442 (N. D. lI. 1926). It is within the discretion of the trial court to refuse to fix an
upset price. Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Camden & T. Ry. Co., 177 Fed. 854 (C. C. A.
3d, 1910); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International C. E. Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A.
2d, 1933). On the inadequacy of the upset price as a device for protecting the dih-entinzg
bondholders see Colin, supra note 11; Frank, supra note 9 at 563, S64.
1. See Pomerance, The Situ of Stock (1931) 17 Co.,. L. Q. 43; Wood, Rcachmg Shares
of Stock (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 219; BnArx, THn CON=uer OF LAws (1935) § 104.1.
2. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1900); see the dis-enting opinion
in Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 200, 58 N. E. 896, 899 (1900).
3. Cf. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917).
4. 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841 (1916).
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rem over the shares because the property involved had its situs there and, could be
reached by service upon the corporation.
In arriving at this result the court overlooks the effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, which has been enacted in New York, upon the determination of stock ownership.0
It may be inferred from the language used by the court in Holmes v. Camp that the
decision in that case would have been different if the Act had been applicable to the
shares involved.7 The principal effect of the Uniform Act is to give to stock certi-
ficates some of the characteristics of negotiable instruments. Title to a certificate
and to the shares represented thereby can be transferred only by delivery of the certi-
ficate, and a bona fide transferee takes free of any infirmities in the title of prior
holders. Consequently when a court awards to a litigant the possession of a stock
certificate, the Transfer Act assures him, as a bona fide holder of the document, the
right to recognition as a shareholder.8 But if the courts at the corporate domicile
should exercise jurisdiction in rem over the share to determine its ownership, adjudi-
cation there would be conclusive despite the court's inability to award possession of
the certificate, and such a judgment would privilege the corporation to refuse recog-
nition to any adverse claimant, even though the latter was the holder of the certificate.0
This result clearly violates the terms of the Act. If, then, the statute is not to be
disregarded, the courts must hold the possessor of the certificate entitled, and so the
exercise of jurisdiction in rem over the share can accomplish nothing. The Act should,
therefore, be regarded as divesting the courts of such jurisdiction.
The doctrine of Holmes v. Camp was justified on the basis of the practical con-
sideration that the courts at the corporate domicile might refuse to recognize as owner
of the share a person elsewhere determined to be owner of the certificate representing
the share. Since the adoption of the Uniform Act amounts to a commitment in advance
that the New York courts will recognize the holder of the instrument, the fear of
inconclusiveness of a determination in a foreign jurisdiction is thus removed, and
Holmes v. Camp should be discarded. Although the Act does not in specific terms
establish a situs for corporate stock, the fact that it prohibits attachments or levies
except by seizure of the certificates indicates that the document is regarded as embody-
ing the property in the share.10 Thus the application of the doctrine of Holmes v.
Camp in the instant case seems to violate the Act, whether the court merely holds that
it has jurisdiction in rem to adjudicate ownership of the share or whether it goes on
to decide that the property is located at the corporate domicile for the purpose of
ancillary administration as well."
5. Howard v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 156 Misc. 358 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Accord: Gagnon
v. Roberts, 131 Misc. 126, 226 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd without opinion, 229
N. Y. Supp. 858 (1st Dep't, 1928) ; Harvey v. Harvey, 290 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
6. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1913) §§ 162-185. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAWS
(1934) §§ 53, 104.
7. Although New York adopted the Act in 1913, Section 184 confines its application to
certificates issued after that date.
8. Turnbull v. Longacre Bank, 249 N. Y. 159, 163 N. E. 135 (1928); cf. Matter of Ulmann
v. Thomas, 255 N. Y. 506, 175 N. E. 192 (1931).
9. But cf. Disconto Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Co., 267 U. S. 22 (1925).
10. N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw (1913) § 174; UmORm STock TRANSFER ACT § 13. Cf.
Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65 (1933).
11. See RESTATEUMNT, Co= r oF LAWS (1934) §§ 477, Comment c, 486 (1).
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